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Explaining Local Government Cooperation on Public Works:
Evidence from Michigan

In recent years, analysts have begun to study cooperation on public services among local
governments. These studies have often concluded that services with scale economies are likely
candidates for shared service delivery. This article contributes to the emerging literature on this
topic by examining interlocal service arrangements for ten public works services in Michigan.
Despite the fact that public works exhibit substantial scale economies, many local governments
do not cooperate on these services. Empirical studies of local government contracting suggest
four groups of factors that may help explain why local governments opt to collaborate on public
services: local economic factors, characteristics of the communities in areas adjacent to the local
government, demographic characteristics of the local government, and the influence of policy
and planning networks. We use data on the service delivery arrangements from 468 generalpurpose local governments in Michigan to examine the role played by the factors in explaining
interlocal cooperation on public works.

Keywords: contracting, collaboration, fiscal stress, networks, logit, public works, roads, sewer,
and water

Article forthcoming in Public Works Management & Policy, Summer 2007
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Explaining Local Government Cooperation on Public Works:
Evidence from Michigan

In this era of fiscal pressure, local governments are continuously challenged to fulfill their roles
as providers of essential public services. Reductions in state and federal aid, rising health care
costs, and legal constraints on the ability of local governments to levy increased taxes all create
fiscal pressures for local governments attempting to maintain or improve the quality and level of
necessary services. As fiscal pressure increases, local public officials are prompted to consider
alternative service delivery options in an effort to reduce costs or avoid cost increases.
In addition to fiscal pressures, the boundary spanning nature of local policy problems
creates a further incentive for local governments to consider alternatives to direct, autonomous
service provision. Extensive jurisdictional fragmentation is often seen as problematic for
effectively managing several different local issues. Environmental issues, crime, economic
development, and many other problems increasingly transcend the borders of political
jurisdictions, creating the need for collective action by local governments (Frederickson, 1999;
Feiock, 2004). Public works functions exemplify the transjurisdictional nature of local public
services as roads and utility trunk lines for vital services such as water and sewer generally
extend over multiple local government boundaries.
Intergovernmental agreements represent one form of alternative service delivery that
local governments might use to maintain service costs, minimize spillover effects, and manage
boundary-spanning infrastructure. These agreements have become a common tool for
cooperative service delivery, as evidenced by the fact that a majority of cities and counties in the
United States are party to at least one such agreement (ACIR, 1985; Zimmerman, 1973).
Interlocal service agreements may hold greater appeal for local government officials than other
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alternatives because they are highly flexible policy instruments. These agreements, whether
established as written contracts or “handshake deals,” are far less permanent than functional
consolidation or special district formation, providing local government officials with the
flexibility to renegotiate terms or opt out when circumstances warrant such a decision.
There are few empirical studies examining why local governments cooperate for public
services. Research on this topic has yet to produce a consensus on the motivations for using these
agreements, the contextual factors predicting their usage, or the types of services covered. The
role played by local fiscal capacity has been particularly difficult to pin down. Some studies have
found fiscal stress to be a highly important factor influencing the decision to use interlocal
agreements (Bartle and Swayze, 1997; Stein, 1990; Wood, 2006), while others have concluded
that resource levels play a secondary role to other factors, such as the desire to improve the
quality of services (Thurmaier and Chen, 2005; Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991; Thurmaier and
Wood, 2002).
We contribute to this emerging literature on interlocal services cooperation with an
analysis of interlocal agreements for public works services. The state of Michigan provides the
context for this study, and the interlocal service delivery arrangements of 468 general-purpose
local governments from across the state serve as the objects of our analysis. For this study,
general-purpose local governments are defined as cities, villages, townships and counties. While
a single-state perspective carries limitations for generalizing the findings, it is also advantageous
in several ways. A single state analysis controls for the influence of variations in state laws, state
political culture, state economies, and a number of other factors that would be nearly impossible
to capture in a multi-state analysis.
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We examine several different questions in this study. First, to what extent do local
governments use interlocal agreements for public works as opposed to other types of services
arrangements? Do local governments of different types vary in their reliance on interlocal
agreements for public works? What are the factors that explain the propensity of governments to
cooperate with other local governments on different public works services? Finally, are
differences in the demographic makeup of different communities important factors in explaining
reliance on interlocal agreements, or instead are these decisions primarily the product of fiscal
considerations, as conventional wisdom suggests?
We believe that an analysis of public works cooperation is important because it is one of
the few areas of local public services in which nearly all aspects of the service are capitalintensive. Services with obvious scale economies are often mentioned as strong candidates for
interlocal cooperation because of the expected cost savings from large-scale projects. Public
works have high costs and are designed to cover large geographic areas in many cases. By
focusing on interlocal cooperation on public works services, we are able to limit the analysis to
services with significant scale economies. This permits us to focus more directly on the many
other factors that may influence cooperation decisions.

Public Services Cooperation through Interlocal Agreements

Interlocal service agreements assume several different forms. The Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 1985) identified three types of interlocal agreements:
intergovernmental service contract, joint service agreement, and intergovernmental service
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transfer. For the purpose of this study, we treat all three forms of these service agreements as
evidence of interlocal cooperation.
Intergovernmental service contracts are legally binding agreements between two or more
general-purpose local government units in which one pays the other for the delivery of a
particular service to the citizens residing in the jurisdiction of the paying government.
Intergovernmental service contracts may be formal (written) or informal (unwritten). Any written
agreement to pay another unit of government for services is a contract, even if the document is
simply a memorandum of understanding (MOU). The ACIR study found that nearly twice as
many cities and counties use written contracts as unwritten contracts, and that unwritten
contracts are more common in cities and counties with populations under 2,500 (ACIR, 1985).
Joint service agreements are those that exist between two or more units of government for
the joint planning, financing, and delivery of a service to the citizens of all jurisdictions
participating in the agreement. Joint agreements specify the division of labor, mutual
responsibilities and liabilities of various parties when multiple jurisdictions collaborate. Previous
research indicates that cities and counties use joint service agreements slightly more often than
contracts (ACIR, 1985). Joint purchase agreements are another form of cooperation in this
category. Local governments sometimes create arrangements for the joint purchase of equipment
and supplies that both governments need.
Intergovernmental service transfers refer to situations in which total responsibility for the
provision of a service is transferred from one governmental unit to another. These transfers may
be permanent or temporary. At the time of the ACIR report, eighteen states had legal provisions
authorizing intergovernmental transfers of service responsibility. Michigan is one of the states
permitting intergovernmental transfer of functions.
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Explanations for why Local Governments Rely on Intergovernmental Service Agreements

When local government officials consider contracting or jointly providing services with
other local governments, their decision to cooperate is likely to be driven in part by the
characteristics of the good or service (Ferris and Graddy, 1986). There is an extensive literature
on local government contracting indicating that services that are asset specific, capital intensive,
or otherwise possess properties of scale economies are strong candidates for delivery through
intergovernmental agreements, and previous research has often focused on these factors. (See
LeRoux (2006) and Shrestha and Feiock (2006) for good reviews of these issues.) Public works
require specialized assets and large capital investments and these characteristics are thought to
provide strong fiscal incentives for the use intergovernmental agreements to provide and deliver
these services.
Public works activities, such as water distribution, solid waste disposal, storm water
management, and highway construction and maintenance are also classic examples of systems
maintenance functions (Williams, 1971). Several studies have found interlocal service
cooperation to be more common for systems maintenance functions than for other types of local
public goods and services (Rawlings, 2003; Savitch and Vogel, 1996; Julnes and Pindur, 1994).
Post’s (2002) analysis of intergovernmental transfers of funds showed that local governments are
more likely to use interlocal arrangements for road construction, housing, parks, and water
distribution than other goods and services. Part of her explanation for this reliance on
cooperative service arrangements was the high initial costs for these types of services.
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Asset specificity is the degree to which specialized investments are necessary to produce
a good or service. Brown and Potoski (2003) demonstrated that the relationship between
interlocal contracting and asset specificity is nonlinear. They found that local governments are
less likely to contract with neighboring units for production as asset specificity increases, but that
when asset specificity reaches very high levels, local governments are substantially more likely
to contract with other local units rather than to produce them independently.
We agree that high degrees of asset specificity, substantial initial costs, and the presence
of significant scale economies mean that public works are strong candidates for provision
through interlocal agreements. However, extant research has identified several other factors
generally expected to influence the likelihood of using cooperative arrangements for local public
services. These factors can be grouped into four types of explanations: local economic factors,
characteristics of the communities in areas adjacent to the local government, demographic
characteristics of the local government, and the influence of policy and planning networks. Many
of these other factors are likely important for explaining the reliance by local governments on
interlocal service agreements for public works.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Instead of focusing on the cost characteristics of individual services, economic
explanations suggest that variations in the fiscal capacity of communities to fund local services
are important predictors of interlocal cooperation. Local governments are expected to turn to
interlocal agreements when they have insufficient resources to meet current service demands or
to undertake necessary infrastructure improvements (Sonenblum, Kirlin, and Ries, 1977).
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Krueger and McGuire (2005) propose that local governments experiencing fiscal stress or with
high-need populations will be motivated to attempt to generate slack resources, and cooperative
service arrangements may provide a means to this end. Indeed, their research shows that cities
with lower tax revenues per capita are more likely to cooperate on service provision with
neighboring communities. High property taxes are believed to be another economic factor
contributing to the use of interlocal agreements. Government officials from high tax cities may
see cooperation as a way to reduce costs, which in turn may enable them to reduce taxes. Tax
reduction may be seen as necessary to retain current residents and attract new ones to the
community (Krueger and McGuire, 2005). Another explanation for service agreements is that
jurisdictions with high property taxes may be approaching the maximum tax levies allowed by
state law, providing another incentive to reduce costs (Morgan, et al., 1988).
Another potential factor is the role played by intergovernmental revenues in promoting
cooperation among local governments. One perspective is that local governments receiving
larger shares of their budget from intergovernmental revenues experience less fiscal stress and
have less incentive to cooperate (LeRoux, 2006). However, heavy reliance on intergovernmental
revenues may mean that their revenues are less stable than if the funding was provided through
own-source revenues, encouraging cost savings behaviors. Also, federal and state grants may
often require the participation of multiple local stakeholders as a condition of receiving funding,
strongly encouraging cooperation (Krueger and McGuire, 2005).
The average wealth of the community may also be an indicator of a local government’s
propensity to cooperate with its neighbors. One common expectation is that jurisdictions heavily
populated by low-income residents will be more inclined to seek interlocal agreements (Morgan
and Hirlinger, 1991). These communities are more likely to experience fiscal stress, and at the
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same time, have large numbers of residents relying on public services. On the other hand,
wealthier jurisdictions may be less likely to cooperate because they can meet current service
demands through own-source revenues and can easily finance desired service enhancements
through their own resources. However, communities that are very wealthy may also cooperate,
but for different reasons than poor communities. Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) argued that
jurisdictions comprised of economic elites are more likely to use interlocal agreements because
they can afford special services and are more willing to experiment with alternative approaches
to service delivery. Indeed, Morgan and Hirlinger found a nonlinear relationship for this factor;
as community wealth increases, local governments were less likely to cooperate, but very
wealthy communities were more likely to use interlocal contracting arrangements.
Finally, another economic factor affecting cooperation is the proportion of local
government expenditures devoted to a particular service. The larger the share of overall
expenditures devoted to any one service likely creates an incentive to reduce the costs of this
service. For example, local governments that have a large proportion of their budget devoted to
public works experience the problem of opportunity costs. Funds that are spent on public works
cannot be spent on other local public services such as public safety. Local elected officials may
prefer greater spending on services of the latter type because they are more visible to citizens.
Interlocal service agreements may be seen as a way to create slack resources that can be used for
other types of services.
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REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

A second set of explanations for the use of interlocal agreements can be roughly
characterized as regional characteristics that influence service supply and demand. The
population and rates of population growth or decline in individual local governments likely play
a role in influencing the demand for public services (LeRoux, 2006). Older, highly developed,
communities with large populations and high population densities often have “full-service”
governments and residents may favor direct provision. However, substantial increases or
decreases in population necessitate changes to existing service levels, which may encourage the
consideration of service-sharing arrangements to purchase any needed additional services or to
reduce excess capacity. Communities losing population over a sustained period of time may be
left with higher service costs than can be supported with the remaining tax base, and may find
interlocal agreements an attractive option for reducing costs (LeRoux, 2006).
Three additional geographic factors that may affect the use of interlocal agreements are
the extent to which the area’s population is concentrated in a single or few jurisdictions, the
number of potential suppliers/buyers in the area, and the population density of the unit. Previous
studies of interlocal cooperation have found that local governments situated in metropolitan areas
are more likely to use interlocal agreements (Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991). The explanation for
this finding is partly based on the logic of high population densities in metropolitan areas
creating a sense of shared problems and a willingness to cooperate across jurisdictional lines.
Kelleher and Lowery (2004) suggest that people living in urban areas where much of the
population is concentrated into a few communities are more likely to see themselves as
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interconnected and to recognize the benefits of cooperation. In a study of interlocal cooperation
in Georgia communities, Campbell and Glynn (1990) found that counties with a majority of
population residing in cities were more likely to cooperate with other local governments.
However, they did not find a similar relationship for interlocal cooperation by city governments.
Post (2002) has argued that cooperation on services increases in proportion to access to
potential collaborators. Greater numbers of jurisdictions directly bordering a particular unit of
local government may increase the likelihood that it will enter into service sharing arrangements.
Access to an abundance of other local governments, however, does not necessarily increase
opportunities for cooperation if many of the jurisdictions in question are small and exiguous in
their provisions, or so large that they are self-sufficient (Post, 2004). Thus, a third factor
affecting the likelihood of cooperation is the distribution of population across the local
governments in the area. When the population within the county, for example, is concentrated
into a few jurisdictions, interlocal cooperation may increase because these larger units may be
the only ones in the area with the financial resources to provide the service. This seems
especially likely with services that have large upfront costs and require expensive asset specific
equipment. However, for other services, more evenly distributed population may suggest lower
incentives for cooperation because each jurisdiction may have sufficient population—and tax
base--to provide the service independently.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

The demographic composition of the community may also impact the likelihood that a
jurisdiction will seek to cooperate with others on service provision. The two demographic
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measures cited most often are the size of the population that is over 65 and the share that is
nonwhite. These two groups are thought to be more highly dependent on local services and
therefore, to favor direct provision. For example, Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) found that the
presence of a large population of older persons was associated with a lower reliance by cities on
interlocal agreements. They proposed that older people tend to be more highly engaged in
community politics and are more likely to favor the status quo. Given that seniors are more
informed, active, and partial to existing arrangements, public officials may be reluctant to oppose
this constituency. Another perspective on the size of the nonwhite population is based on
expectations about the effects of racial heterogeneity, rather than on patterns on service demands
attributed to nonwhite residents. Oakerson (2004) has argued that homogeneity of the citizenry
enables local public officials to “speak with one voice” in making governing decisions on behalf
of the local electorate. As the size of the nonwhite population increases, public officials may be
less inclined to seek interlocal service agreements because of difficulties in accommodating the
diversity of preferences in their community and will instead rely on direct supply to avoid
controversy.

POLICY AND PLANNING NETWORKS

Finally, local governments affiliated through policy and planning networks, such as
councils of government or other types of regional planning bodies, may be more likely to
cooperate on services (Lackey, Freshwater, and Rupasingha 2002; Thurmaier and Wood, 2002).
As regional planning entities, councils of government and metropolitan planning organizations
facilitate interaction among city managers and functional specialists throughout a region, and
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may function in a brokering capacity for local governments who wish to enter into service
sharing arrangements. Moreover, these types of organizations provide opportunities for ongoing
face-to-face contact among governing officials, which is believed to increase trust and reduce
transaction costs to enable cooperation by local governments (Feiock, 2004).

Analysis

The data used in this study are taken from a larger project on service delivery
arrangements used by local governments in Michigan.1 The project surveyed local government
officials in Spring 2005 about the service delivery arrangements in their unit for 116 different
local public services.2 The data were collected through surveys of the city administrator or
mayor, village manager or president, or township supervisor of every local general-purpose
government within twenty-four Michigan counties. Responses were received from 70 percent
(468 units) of the governments surveyed and were evenly distributed across the three different
types of jurisdictions.3
The survey data reveal the service arrangements used by responding jurisdictions for ten
different public works services. Table 1 identifies the service areas examined, and the variables
and measures used in the analyses. Interlocal cooperation is measured as a dichotomous variable
indicating the local government reported sharing service provision with another local
government. More specifically, a local government is considered to engage in interlocal
cooperation if it was reported to: purchase the service from the county or another city, village, or
township; take part in a joint provision arrangement with one or more of these other governments
or; have transferred the responsibility for providing the service to another local general-purpose
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government. This measure of interlocal cooperation indicates the existence of interlocal service
arrangements, but does not measure the extent of the cooperation in terms of levels of shared
activities, dollars expended, or people served. Also, this measure does not identify the partner(s)
in these arrangements, only that the local unit has a partner in the delivery of this service. These
are significant limitations, and they prevent us from drawing insights about how the factors
examined in this study affect the extent of cooperation and choices of partners.

Insert Table 1 about here.

We use logistic regression to examine the factors affecting the likelihood that Michigan
local governments cooperate on these ten different public works services. Each model includes
measures for the four groups of explanatory variables suggested by the literature review in the
previous section: economic factors, local/regional characteristics, local demographic
characteristics, and policy and planning networks. A problem often confronted in cross-sectional
multivariate analyses is a situation in which the value of the dependent variable is conditional on
the level of some another variable, thus violating the standard assumption of conditional
exchangeability (Zorn, 2006). This violation is especially likely to occur when data are grouped
or clustered in some way and the within-group variation in these observations differs from the
variations seen across the groups. In some instances, the basis for this clustering is obvious, such
as with repeated measures of subjects, and in other times, the basis is less clear.4 In this case, the
choice of the type of local government as the cluster variable is straightforward.
The models in Tables 4 and 5 treat local governments of each type as clusters because the
decision made by local public officials to cooperate on services with other local governments is
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affected, at least in part, by whether the local government is a municipality, village, or township.
In Michigan, these three governments were conceived to operate as a system of local
government, with substantially different expectations for the types and levels of public services
provided by each type of local government. Townships were expected to provide basic services
to the rural areas of the state; villages were designed to provide expanded services for the more
densely populated areas of townships; and municipalities were intended to be the “full service”
units in the system, authorized to provide a wide range of services to their residents (Ryan and
Lupher, 2003). These distinctions have been eroded somewhat in recent decades, but important
differences remain among the three types of governments in authorized services, and taxing and
bonding authority.5 Thus, to a large extent, governments of the same type have similar service
responsibilities, revenue sources, and are subject to similar limits on tax and debt. These
similarities mean local governments of the same types share propensities to cooperate on
particular services beyond what can be explained by similarities in factors such as economic
resources, regional characteristics, the demographic makeup of the community, and participation
in planning and policy networks.

Discussion

Tables 2 and 3 describe the service delivery tendencies of the local governments included
in this study. Table 2 shows the arrangements indicated by those governments reporting they
provided the service through a cooperative arrangement with another local government or a
private provider. These data show that these governments cooperate on roads much more
frequently than they do on the water and sewer utilities examined. These jurisdictions reported
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using special districts for these two groups of services at approximately the same rates, but rely
more heavily on private contractors for the construction and improvement of roads, and for
maintaining streetlights. Table 3 illustrates the variation in the use of cooperative arrangements
for these same services across the three types of local governments. Townships reported
cooperating with other local governments on roads much more frequently than did municipalities
and villages. Given that in the Michigan system, cities and counties spend the bulk of the money
expended on roads in the state, this is not surprising (Ryan and Lupher, 2003). The typical
township government is far more likely to rely on the county for road services than to directly
provide this service. In contrast, municipalities reported using cooperative arrangements for most
water and sewer services more frequently than did villages and townships.

Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here.

Tables 4 and 5 present the findings of the multivariate analyses examining measures of
local economic factors, local demographics, regional characteristics, and participation in policy
and planning networks on the likelihood of the local government engaging in interlocal
cooperation for these ten public works services. The findings show that the roles played by the
factors vary in interesting and important ways across the different types of services and among
the services in each group.
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ROLE PLAYED BY ECONOMIC FACTORS

We turn first to the models examining services for roads and streets. Local economic
factors appear to play a role in decisions by local governments to cooperate in most aspects of
the roads services examined. Maintaining streetlights is the only road/street function in which the
economic measures examined were not statistically related to the likelihood of cooperation on
the service. The analyses show that units with high per capita property taxes rely more heavily
on cooperative arrangements for road construction and improvement, and for maintaining roads.
Per capita property taxes, however, are not related to the likelihood of cooperation when it comes
to the lower cost activities of maintaining traffic signs, signals, and streetlights. Units with a
greater reliance on intergovernmental revenues were more likely to collaborate on roads. It is
unclear whether this reliance is due to grantors favoring collaborative projects in their funding
decisions, because the instability of the grant funding encourages cost minimizing/sharing
activities, or for some other reason. However, it is clear that a greater reliance on
intergovernmental revenues is not associated with less cooperation as suggested in past works.
The findings also show that cooperation on roads is less likely as wealth increases, except
that the wealthiest communities are more likely to cooperate, confirming the nonlinear
relationship asserted in earlier studies (Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991). When communities are
very poor they are more likely to cooperate on road and street services, probably by relying on
the county. This tendency toward cooperation disappears as community wealth increases, but
reemerges among very wealthy communities. Finally, the proportion of unit expenditures
devoted to public works also increases the likelihood of cooperation, but only for construction
and maintenance of roads. This finding is consistent with the argument offered in the literature
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that local governments are more likely to cooperate when a large portion of their budget is
devoted to a particular service.
Turning to the utilities models, the findings reveal that the measures of local resources
available to local governments matter far less in the decision to cooperate on water and sewer
utilities. The per capita income measures are not statistically significant in any of the six models
and the property tax burden measure is significant in only two (water and sewer treatment)
models. The intergovernmental revenues measure is significant in only a single (water treatment)
model, suggesting that variations in non own-source resources are not decisive either. In the two
models examining treatment services, greater economic resources are associated with less
cooperation with other local governments for these services. The findings from these models also
reveal that cooperation on sewer collection and treatment is less likely when public works is a
large share of the unit’s total spending.
Two general conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, road and street
services, particularly those related to construction and improvement, are expensive, but the cost
of utilities is greater. The expense involved with constructing and maintaining water and sewer is
a significant burden for many communities, even those with high property values and highincome residents. Spending on roads and streets are fairly easily limited to what can be afforded
by the local government, whereas the costs of utilities can increase in large chunks as capacity is
increased. Also, a change to the capacity of utilities is lumpier than it is for roads and streets, and
expansions of utilities often result in large additions to the numbers of people served. Second,
unlike roads, water and sewer utilities are typically supported through user fees designed to
recover the costs of providing the service. This likely reduces the connection between local
resource levels and the ability of communities to provide the utility services.
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ROLE PLAYED BY LOCAL/REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Local/regional characteristics capture the effects of variations in local population,
density, and population change over the previous decade on the unit’s likelihood of cooperating
with other local governments to provide public works. These measures also reveal how the
population distribution in the area affects the likelihood of the unit cooperating and if the number
of bordering cities matters in these decisions. The findings show that these factors are part of the
explanation for decisions to cooperate on road construction and improvement, and for
maintaining roads. However, local/regional characteristics are less useful for understanding
decisions to cooperate on maintaining the ancillary transportation infrastructure of road signs,
signals, and streetlights.
The regression models show that these measures are related to cooperation levels on
roads, largely as predicted by previous studies. Populous and high growth units are more likely
to cooperate than their smaller and slower growth counterparts. This finding may reflect
cooperation to support enhanced services in growing areas. More densely populated units are less
likely to cooperate on roads, suggesting, perhaps, that more dense populations mean lower road
costs on a per capita basis, and less pressure to reduce or share costs. Put another way, the
findings show that less density means more cooperation, which also makes intuitive sense. In
Michigan, rural townships often cooperate with counties to provide roads services (Ryan and
Lupher, 2003).6 Finally, local governments in counties where the population is concentrated into
a few jurisdictions are more likely to cooperate on constructing and improving roads.
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An unexpected finding is the apparent cooperation-depressing effect of having larger
numbers of potential collaborators in the immediate area. In half of the models, units with larger
numbers of local governments immediately adjacent to them were less likely to cooperate on
roads. In other two models, the number of bordering communities was unrelated to the
cooperation levels.
Table 5 shows very similar findings for these local and regional demographic measures in
the utilities models. Populous and high growth communities generally (10 of 12 models) rely
more heavily on interlocal cooperation for the utilities examined. As already noted, capacity
increases in utilities are lumpy, or non-incremental, and local governments experiencing rapid
population growth may have difficulty expanding service levels to meet the demands of a larger
population at a cost they can afford. In this situation, local officials may view cooperation with
another local government that already has made the investments in infrastructure as a costeffective way to manage the community’s growth.
Population density is generally not related to cooperation on water and sewer utilities in
these models. This measure is statistically significant for only two functions (sewer treatment
and stormwater management) and the coefficients indicate different relationships to the
likelihood of cooperation. Likewise, units in counties that are highly concentrated are more
likely to cooperate on sewer treatment and storm water management. The extent of population
concentration is unrelated to cooperation on the other four services
Finally, the number of potential collaborators is related to cooperation in four of six
models. However, as with the roads models, greater numbers of adjacent local governments
reduce the likelihood of cooperation on sewer and stormwater services. This is a very important
finding, given the attention to the supply of alternative providers in the contracting literature
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(Brown and Potoski, 2003; Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991). These findings suggest that access to
potential service suppliers is not as important as Post (2002) concluded, at least when it comes to
cooperation on public works.

ROLE PLAYED BY LOCAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

The regression models in Tables 4 and 5 include measures intended to capture the
influence of two important local constituencies on the likelihood a unit cooperates with other
local governments on roads or utilities. Both constituencies, seniors and nonwhite residents, are
expected to prefer the status quo and to generally resist services contracting, irrespective of
whether the contractor is a private firm or another local government. Our findings provide
limited support for this depiction. With regard to roads, three of four models show that a larger
population of seniors is associated with less cooperation on these services and half of the models
show that a larger nonwhite population is also linked to less cooperation. The size of either group
is not statistically related to the likelihood of cooperation on road construction and improvement.
Thus, in a broad sense, both sets of findings confirm patterns found in previous works and lend
support to the idea that both constituencies resist shared service arrangements, even when the
other party is another local government.
However, the findings for the models examining water and sewer services lend support to
a slightly different conclusion about the role of these two groups. Most of the models (4 of 6)
show no statistical relationship between these two demographic measures and cooperation. The
two models that do are for water and sewer treatment. A larger population of older people and
nonwhites means more cooperation is more likely on these two services. Our findings for both
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sets of services confirm previous findings but add depth to our understanding of the role played
by seniors and nonwhites in interlocal cooperation. Larger shares of these two groups in the local
population are associated with a higher reliance on public works cooperation in the case of the
two most expensive services; are unrelated to cooperation on moderately expensive services; and
are associated with lower cooperation on the cheaper services.

ROLE PLAYED BY PLANNING AND POLICY NETWORKS

Finally, the models in Tables 4 and 5 provide no support for the idea that membership in
the local council of governments effects the likelihood that a city, village, or township
government will cooperate with other local governments for the provision of roads or water and
sewer utilities. Of course, COG membership is only one way to measure the role of planning and
policy networks, and it is possible that participation in other local networks affects the
cooperation decision. The difficulty in effectively measuring this factor is that these networks are
often fairly informal and may simply amount to participation in a regular meeting where
participants discuss common issues (LeRoux, 2006).

Conclusions and Implications

This analysis of interlocal cooperation on public works in Michigan offers several
insights about collaboration on local public services. Local governments regularly cooperate on
the provision of a variety of public works services, including road construction and maintenance,
and on a variety of water and sewer utilities. Township governments are somewhat more likely
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than villages and municipalities to cooperate on roads, and municipalities are slightly more likely
to cooperate on water and sewer utilities than townships, and much more likely than village
governments. Substantial scale economies, large initial costs, and the high asset specificity of
these services make them likely candidates for contracting or some form of shared service
delivery. Yet despite the expected cost advantages of collaborating on public works services,
many local governments do not collaborate.
The study has also sought to provide insights into the role played by factors other than the
cost characteristics and asset specificity of the services in explaining public works cooperation.
The findings show that the other factors, especially the measures of local economic resources,
population levels and distribution, and size of key constituencies, are related to the likelihood of
cooperation matter in predictable ways. This is an important finding. Although research on
interlocal cooperation has steadily increased in recent years, much of this work focuses on the
cost and measurement characteristics of public services. The analyses presented here show that
characteristics of the community are also important factors in understanding decisions to
cooperate on service delivery.
While fiscal considerations play an important role in shaping cooperation decisions for
some types of services, they do not serve as a universal rationale for cooperation decisions.
Fiscal considerations drive cooperation decisions only to the extent local governments have some
discretion over the level or quantity of the service. While both roads and utilities are capital
intensive, spending for services such roads and streets can be fairly easily limited to what the
local government can afford, whereas the costs of utilities can increase in substantial increments
as capacity is increased. Jurisdictions may delay a regularly scheduled road repair because of
cost considerations, but they do not have the same luxury when it comes to ensuring residents

24

have clean water to drink. In short, local economic resources available to the community only
dictate cooperation decisions to the extent there is decision flexibility built into the service.
This analysis also demonstrates that access to potential collaboration partners is a
necessary but insufficient condition for cooperating on public works. The size, growth pattern,
and composition of the community, along with amount of flexibility that local public officials
have with regard to spending for the service are what provide the basis for cooperation on public
works. Moreover, the role of various groups and constituencies in influencing cooperation
decisions cannot be underestimated. While certain constituencies may be successful in
influencing cooperation decisions only on functions that are less expensive to begin with, this
analysis nevertheless suggests a need to involve citizens in decisions early in the planning
process.
Finally, even though it is unclear from this analysis whether interlocal agreements result
in cost savings, local governments might enjoy dividends in the form of intangible benefits by
engaging in these transactions. Interlocal agreements help to build trust among local government
officials. As a result, interlocal agreements may pave the way for future cooperation between
jurisdictions. To the extent that local governments will need to act collectively in the future in
order to manage transjurisdictional problems, interlocal agreements may be useful because they
help to establish the foundation for cooperative norms.
Future research on public works cooperation should focus on factors that were beyond
the scope of this analysis. Additional explanations for public service cooperation more generally
include form of government, professional management, and jurisdictional participation in forums
that provide opportunities for interaction among governing officials. The political incentives of
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elected officeholders may also help to shape interlocal cooperation decisions, and might thus be
examined in future analyses.
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Notes
AUTHORS NOTE: We thank Elisabeth Gerber (University of Michigan), Eric Lupher (Citizens
Research Council of Michigan), and two anonymous reviewers for comments on a previous
version of this article, and Mary Charles (Michigan Municipal League) and Eric Scorsone
(Michigan State University) for assistance in assembling the data on local government finances
used in this analysis.
1. This larger project sought to catalog the services offered by Michigan local governments and
to identity the arrangements used to deliver these services. The Citizens Research Council of
Michigan (www.crcmich.org) collected these data in 2005 with funding from the C.S. Mott
Foundation, the Earhart Foundation, the Frey Foundation, the Gilmore Foundation, and the
Community Foundation for Muskegon County.
2. For each service, respondents were provided ten options and asked to choose the one that best
described their unit’s service delivery arrangements. Respondent were asked to choose multiple
responses only when necessary. The options presented were: (1) Does not provide or contract
for this service-this service is not the responsibility of, and therefore is not provided by, your
unit. (2) Directly provides this service-your unit is providing this service, through its
employees, directly to its residents. (3) Also provides this service by contract to residents of
anther community-your unit is providing this service, through some sort of contract or
agreement, to residents of another community, in addition to providing it to your own residents.
(4) Provides this service in cooperation with the county or another municipality-your unit
has entered into an agreement with your county to jointly provide this service to your and other
residents, or with a neighboring jurisdiction to provide this service to both units’ residents in
conjunction. (5) Has this service provided by the state-your unit contracts with the state to
provide this service to your residents. (6) Has this service provided by the county-your county
provides this service to all your residents. (7) Has the service provided by another
municipality-your unit has some sort of agreement or contract with another local jurisdiction to
have them deliver this service to your residents. (8) Has this service provided by a special
authority or special district-your unit has joined a special authority with other units of local
government to provide this service to all residents within the special authority. (9) Has this
service provided by a private provider-your unit has hired, or contracted with, a
nongovernmental private firm-for profit or nonprofit-to provide this service to residents. (10) Do
not know how this service is provided-you are unaware if this service is being provided by
another unit, but your unit is no currently providing this service.
3. The surveys were mailed in Winter 2005 to every city, village, township, and county
government in 24 Michigan counties. These 670 units of government represent 36 percent of the
1,859 general-purpose local governments in Michigan and contain 78 percent of the state’s
population. Responses were received from 464 of the 670 governments surveyed, for a response
rate of 69 percent. Response rates for each type of government were: 67 percent for counties (16
of 24); 71 percent for cities (114 of 160); 65 percent for villages (54 of 83); and 69 percent for
townships (280 of 403). For additional information on the survey, see CRC (2005).
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4. Zorn (2006) cautions that the selection of the cluster variable will have a greater effect on the
substantive conclusions drawn from the analysis than the choice of estimator.
5. Michigan law permits residents of townships to adopt a “charter” township government, which
enables the unit to have certain powers not permitted to general law townships. Similarly,
Michigan law also allows residents of general law villages to adopt home rule charters giving
these units additional powers. See CRC (1999).
6. Townships in Michigan are not required to participate in road construction and maintenance.
They may choose to do so, but many simply leave this responsibility to the county (Ryan and
Lupher, 2003). Many townships reported cooperating with the county government for road
construction and maintenance. However, in many of these instances it may be more accurate be
term this service arrangement as county provision of a county responsibility.
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Table 1: Description of Variables and Measures
Dependent Variables

Mean/
Std Dev.

Min/
Max

Description/Coding/Source

Interlocal Cooperation on Roads
and Bridges
Construction/Improvement

.63/.48

0/1

Maintenance

.62/.48

0/1

Signs and Signals

.70/.45

0/1

Streetlights

.32/.46

0/1

Water Distribution

.31/.46

0/1

Water Treatment

.39/.49

0/1

Sewer Collection

.31/.46

0/1

Sewer Treatment

.42/.49

0/1

Storm Water Collection

.25/.43

0/1

Storm Water Management

.28/.45

0/1

17.8/14.4

0/65

Proportion of the unit’s total expenditures devoted to public works in 2004. Source: Annual
Local Unit Fiscal Report (Form F-65), State of Michigan, Department of Treasury.

41.1/17

0/79

Proportion of the unit’s total expenditures from county, state, and federal sources in 2004.
Source: Annual Local Unit Fiscal Report (Form F-65), State of Michigan, Department of
Treasury.

Unit cooperates on provision of service with a city, village, township, or county
government, by providing the service to another government, jointly providing it with
another government, or having this service provided to it by another government. Variable
takes on values of 0 (No) or 1 (Yes). Source: Catalog of Local Government Services
Cooperation, the Citizens Research Council of Michigan, 2005

Interlocal Cooperation on Utilities
Unit cooperates on provision of service with a city, village, township, or county
government, by providing the service to another government, jointly providing it with
another government, or having this service provided to it by another government. Variable
takes on values of 0 (No) or 1 (Yes). Source: Catalog of Local Government Services
Cooperation, the Citizens Research Council of Michigan, 2005.

Independent Variables
Economic Factors

Public Works Spending

Intergovernmental Revenues
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Unit property taxes per capita in 2004. Source: Annual Local Unit Fiscal Report (Form F65), State of Michigan, Department of Treasury.

Property Tax Per Capita

176/259

0/4367

Income Per Capita

23,095/
9,589

2,396/110,
683

Unit personal income per capita in 2004. Source: U.S Census Bureau, 2000 .

19.99/.617

15.6/23.2

Log of unit’s personal income per capita in 2004 squared. Source: U.S Census Bureau,
2000.

Population

8.4/1.3

4.1/13.8

Log of unit’s population in 2000. Source: U.S Census Bureau, 2000.

Population Change

12/23.7

-75/387

Percent change in unit population from 1990 to 2000. Source: U.S Census Bureau, 2000.

Population Density

1084/1515

1.5/10940

3.3/1.5

1/9

Income Per Capita (Squared)
Local/Regional Characteristics

Adjacent Borders

Persons per square mile in unit in 2000. Source: U.S Census Bureau, 2000.
Number of local governments with borders directly adjacent to the unit in 2002. Source:
LeRoux, 2006.

.13/.06

.04/.27

Herfindahl index of 2000 population dispersion across the local governments within the
unit’s county. Index is calculated by summing the squared population proportions of each
local government within the county. Variable ranges from 0 to 1. Source: U.S Census
Bureau, 2000.

Size of older population

12/4.10

4/39

Percentage of unit population in 2000 that is age 65 or over. Source: U.S Census Bureau,
2000.

Size of nonwhite population

6.9/11.7

.28/95

Percentage of unit population in 2000 that is nonwhite. Source: U.S Census Bureau, 2000.

.47/.49

0/1

Dichotomous variable indicating local unit is a member of a “Council of Governments” in
2002. Variable takes on values of 0 (No) or 1 (Yes). Source: Michigan Association of
Regions, 2005.

2.3/.85

1/3

Categorical variable indicating type of local general-purpose government. Variable takes
on values of 1 (City), 2 (Village), and 3 (Township). Source: State of Michigan,
Department of Treasury, 2004.

Extent of Population Concentration
Local Demographic Characteristics

Policy and Planning Network

COG Member
Cluster Variable
Type of Government
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Table 2
Local Governments’ Choice of Alternative Service Delivery for Public Works:
Roads, Water, and Sewer

Roads
Construction/improvement
Maintenance
Signs and signals
Streetlights
Water and Sewer
Water distribution
Water treatment
Sewer collection
Sewer treatment
Storm water collection
Storm water management
n=445

Interlocal
Agreement

Special District/
Public Authority

Private
Contractor

63%
63%
70%
32%

1%
>1%
>1%
3%

23%
8%
6%
38%

31%
40%
32%
42%
25%
23%

4%
6%
5%
6%
2%
2%

4%
4%
4%
4%
5%
3%

Row totals do not add to 100% because some jurisdictions provide independently of cooperative or contractual
arrangements and a small number indicate they do not provide these functions at all.
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Table 3
Percentage of Local Governments that Cooperate on Public Works:
Roads, Water, and Sewer
Municipalities
Villages
Townships
Roads
Construction/improvement
21%
21%
89%
Maintenance
19%
10%
91%
Signs and signals
49%
20%
88%
Streetlights
17%
6%
43%
Water and Sewer
Water distribution
37%
8%
34%
Water treatment
60%
19%
35%
Sewer collection
41%
7%
32%
Sewer treatment
68%
15%
37%
Storm water collection
21%
8%
30%
Storm water management
25%
4%
26%
n=
112
54
274
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Table 4
Why do Local Governments Cooperate on Road Functions?
Factors that Explain Cooperation on Traffic Signals and Construction/Maintenance of Roads and Streets
Construction
and Improvements
B
SE
Economic Factors
Public works spending
Intergovernmental revenues
Per capita property tax
Per capita income
Per capita income sq
Local/Regional
Characteristics
Population
Population change (%)
Population density
Adjacent borders
Pop concentration in county
Local Demographic
Characteristics
Percent pop >65
Percent pop nonwhite
Policy/Planning Network
COG member

Maintenance
B

SE

Signs and
Signals
B
SE

Streetlights
B

SE

.013**
.057***
.000**
-.000***
2.858***

.005
.019
.000
.000
.593

.011
.047***
.000***
-.000***
1.585***

.007
.010
.000
.000
.521

.011
.057**
-.000
-.000**
2.819***

.008
.025
.000
.000
1.085

-.000
.004
-.001
.000
-.330

.009
.013
.002
.000
.770

.315*
.013**
-.000***
-.134***
4.192***

.188
.005
.000
.033
.567

.635***
.003
-.000***
-.103***
1.841

.242
.008
.000
.028
2.364

.362
.013***
-.000
-.072
.545

.287
.005.
.000
.113
1.141

.293
.006
-.000
-.000
-2.984***

.231
.010
.000
.076
.422

-1.042
.002

3.512
.016

-5.659***
.001

.623
.018

-.683***
-.022*

.019
.012

-12.819***
-.007*

2.460
.004

-.272

.521

-.696**

.328

-.590***

.076

-.495

.602

Constant

-57.706***

13.335

-35.010***

11.862

-57.497***

21.106

4.554

16.633

Pseudo R2
Log likelihood
n=
n (clusters, jurisdiction type)

.319
-141.3259
317
3

.355
-134.91484
317
3

.209
-148.2463
318
3

.125
-176.59318
317
3

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Table 5
Why do Local Governments Cooperate on Utilities?
Factors that Explain Water and Sewer Cooperation
Water
Distribution
Economic Factors
Public works spending
Intergovernmental revenues
Per capita property tax
Per capita income
Per capita income sq
Local/Regional
Characteristics
Population
Population change (%)
Population density
Adjacent borders
Pop concentration in county
Local Demographic
Characteristics
Percent pop >65
Percent pop nonwhite
Policy/Planning Network
COG member
Constant
Pseudo R2
Log likelihood
n=
n (clusters, jurisdiction type)

Water
Treatment

Sewer
Collection

Sewer
Treatment

Stormwater
Collection

Stormwater
Management

-.000
-.012
-.000
-.000
-.162

.008
.010
.001
.000
.740

.003
-.020*
-.001**
-.000
1.311

.003
.010
.000
.000
.903

-.011***
-.000
-.000
.000
.287

.003
.008
.000
.000
1.070

-.011***
-.000
-.001***
-.000
1.628

.004
.001
.000
.000
1.045

-.001
.002
-.000
.000
.052

.002
.004
.001
.000
.592

-.000
.000
-.000
.000
.008

.002
.011
.000
.000
.382

.605***
.006***
-.000
.009
.944

.191
.002
.000
.049
.693

.502***
.007***
.000
-.005
-1.203

.165
.001
.000
.022
1.679

.554***
.010**
-.000
-.096***
1.368

.070
.005
.000
.034
.932

.620***
.014*
.000***
-.112***
1.045**

.166
.007
.000
.042
.441

.521
.008***
-.000
-.146***
4.788

.335
.002
.000
.043
3.614

.683***
.006
-.000*
-.118***
3.481**

.129
.008
.000
.023
1.733

2.200
.006

3.672
.012

12.401***
.009**

.739
.004

4.459
.006

3.603
.011

11.321***
.005**

1.799
.002

.759
.015*

3.621
.008

1.117
.005

2.984
.015

.168

.582

-.093

.154

-.084

.428

-.150

.243

-.018

.725

-.193

.539

-3.248

16.180

-30.547*

18.061

-11.825

20.850

-38.467**

19.188

-7.303

12.269

-7.409

7.859

.109
-175.35278
315
3

.165
-177.62963
316
3

.114
-174.06279
316
3

.226
-166.53943
317
3

.096
-161.98008
314
3

.106
-171.25949
314
3

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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